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The graph also highlights two 
HRRs in Texas that have been 
frequently discussed since the 
publication of Atul Gawande’s 
New Yorker article “The Cost Co-
nundrum”: McAllen and El Paso.3 
Unadjusted risk scores suggest 
that patients in McAllen are 25% 
sicker than patients in El Paso, 
but our adjusted estimates sug-
gest that patients in McAllen are 
only 15% sicker. In other words, 
in keeping with Gawande’s con-
jecture, a nontrivial share of the 
difference in measured health be-
tween the two areas can be ex-
plained by more intensive diag-
nostic practices by doctors in 
McAllen than doctors in El Paso. 
If risk scores were adjusted to ac-
count for this finding, the gap in 
risk score–based reimbursements 
between McAllen and El Paso 
would shrink by about 10 percent-
age points.
The map shows the geographic 
patterns that emerge from our 
risk-score adjustment. Teal areas 
(in general, the West and Mid-
west) have patient populations 
that are less healthy than one 
would expect on the basis of raw 
risk scores — that is, they have 
providers who tend to diagnose 
less aggressively. Purple areas (in 
general, the Northeast and South) 
have patient populations that are 
more healthy than standard risk-
adjustment measures would pre-
dict — that is, they have provid-
ers who tend to have greater 
diagnostic intensity. Medicare Ad-
vantage payments based on our 
adjusted risk score measures 
would tend to increase by as much 
as 10 to 15% in the dark teal areas 
of the map and fall by 10 to 15% 
in the dark purple areas.
Our goal here is to provide an 
example of how the area-specific 
adjustment factors we calculated 
may be useful in practice. We ex-
pect that the adjustment factors 
may also be useful in observa-
tional studies that compare the 
outcomes of patients in supposed-
ly similar health who are exposed 
to different treatments, as well as 
in public reporting programs in 
which patient choices or physi-
cian referrals may be based on 
risk-adjusted quality measures.
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The vaccine-development re-sponse to the 2014 Ebola epi-
demic in West Africa, though a 
valiant effort, was too little, too 
late. Three vaccine candidates 
were tested successfully under 
challenging conditions.1-3 Govern-
ments and foundations mobilized 
funds quickly. Companies and 
research-and-development institu-
tions brought vaccine candidates 
into the field. Collaborations 
among the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO), funders, academia, 
civil society, and industry saw 
vaccines advancing through more 
than 15 accelerated clinical trials 
in a year. But the testing of Ebola 
vaccine candidates had previously 
stalled, though several candidates 
could have been ready for efficacy 
testing before the epidemic if the 
necessary investments had been 
made. In the absence of data on 
safety, immunogenicity, and dos-
ing in humans, it was challeng-
ing to progress quickly with effi-
cacy trials in West Africa. As a 
result, people who could have 
been protected instead became 
infected, and too many of them 
died. Moreover, there is no guar-
antee of similar risk-taking efforts 
in the future, especially given the 
poor market potential and the 
great clinical and regulatory un-
certainties.
Vaccines can prevent outbreaks 
of emerging infectious disease 
from becoming humanitarian cri-
ses. The WHO recently deemed 
11 pathogens as the most likely 
to cause severe outbreaks in the 
near future and will regularly up-
date its list (see table). There are 
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feasible vaccine candidates for 
some of these diseases. When 
such candidates exist, timely vac-
cine development can avert global 
public health emergencies, con-
tain loss of life, and limit social 
and economic damage.
An efficient global system of 
vaccine research-and-development 
preparedness is needed. Since we 
generally have poor clinical vac-
cine-development pipelines for epi-
demic infectious diseases,4 such 
diseases can emerge and spread 
faster than we can successfully 
develop vaccines. Platform tech-
nologies that could reduce devel-
opment times in an emergency 
are often not validated for human 
use in advance, which delays the 
start of clinical trials. Delays can 
also result from the time taken to 
reach agreement on appropriate 
clinical trial design, even when 
products are ready for testing. 
And regulatory pathways are not 
easily adaptable to epidemic con-
texts, especially in regions with 
weaker regulatory capacity and 
where outbreaks are more likely.
Current vaccine-development 
efforts are fragmented, with no 
sustainable mechanism to sup-
port them across national bor-
ders and direct them toward 
global epidemic risks. Several 
countries have invested in research 
targeting prevention of the emer-
gence and spread of pathogens 
likely to cause outbreaks that 
could affect them. But countries 
at the epicenter of outbreaks of 
emerging infectious diseases usu-
ally lack such research capacity. 
Uncoordinated government fund-
ing cannot efficiently and sus-
tainably address global epidemic 
risks. Vaccine developers end up 
spending their own resources to 
test products for epidemic condi-
tions without any guarantee of 
risk sharing by governments seek-
ing their help.
To address these problems, 
leaders from governments, foun-
dations, industry, and civil soci-
ety came together at the January 
2016 World Economic Forum 
meeting in Davos, Switzerland, 
and agreed to explore new ways 
to drive vaccine innovation for 
high-priority public health threats. 
The meeting was inspired by a 
call for a new vaccine fund5 — 
and by proposals and expressions 
of interest from major vaccine 
manufacturers for new and dedi-
cated partnership structures. It 
was supported by an emerging 
consensus from the 2015 Oslo 
consultation on Financing of 
R&D Preparedness and Response 
to Epidemic Emergencies and the 
process outlined in the WHO 
Research and Development Blue-
print for creating a global financ-
ing facility for developing bio-
medical countermeasures against 
emerging infections. Since the 
Davos meeting, more than 80 or-
ganizations and more than 200 
individuals have collaborated to 
create the Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). 
Its mission is to stimulate, fi-
nance, and coordinate the develop-
ment of vaccines against epidemic 
infectious diseases, especially in 
cases in which market incentives 
alone are insufficient.5
Between February and June 
2016, CEPI convened three expert 
task teams to assess challenges 
and potential solutions for patho-
gen prioritization, clinical devel-
opment, manufacturing capacity, 
and regulatory pathways; partner-
ship models; and funding strate-
gies. The teams recommended 
that CEPI initially draw on the 
disease priority list in the WHO 
Blueprint as it gradually develops 
its own vaccine-prioritization pro-
Diseases to be urgently addressed under the WHO Research and Development 
Blueprint
Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever virus
Filovirus diseases (Ebola and Marburg)
Highly pathogenic emerging coronaviruses relevant to humans (Middle East respi‑
ratory syndrome coronavirus [MERS‑CoV], severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus [SARS‑CoV])
Lassa fever virus
Nipah virus
Rift Valley fever virus
Any new severe infectious disease
Serious diseases necessitating further action as soon as possible
Chikungunya
Severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome
Congenital abnormalities and other neurologic complications associated with Zika 
virus
*  Information is from the Research and Development Blueprint for action to prevent 
epidemics, plan of action, May 2016, World Health Organization. Prioritization crite‑
ria included human transmissibility (including population immunity and behavioral 
factors); severity or case fatality rate; spillover potential; evolutionary potential; avail‑
able countermeasures; difficulty of detection or control; public health context of the 
affected areas; potential scope of outbreak (risk of international spread); and poten‑
tial societal impact. The group of experts who developed the list represented a range 
of disciplines, including virology, microbiology, immunology, public health, clinical 
medicine, mathematical and computational modeling, product development, and 
respiratory and severe emerging infections. The conclusions of the experts were re‑
viewed by the Blueprint’s independent Scientific Advisory Group.
Top Emerging Pathogens Likely to Cause Severe Outbreaks in the Near Future.*
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cess. CEPI will initially focus on 
investments in essential gaps in 
product development, especially 
from late preclinical studies to 
proof of concept in humans 
(phase 2 trials); support for tech-
nical and institutional platforms 
that can be used for rapid vac-
cine development against known 
and unknown pathogens in the 
event of a new epidemic; partner-
ship arrangements building on 
capabilities of advanced vaccine 
developers and manufacturers; and 
end-to-end coordination among 
stakeholders through plans to 
mobilize resources, manage and 
distribute stockpiles, and acceler-
ate vaccine testing and approval 
during epidemics. Priority will 
also be given to contributions to 
finishing the job on Ebola vac-
cines.
Building on the task teams’ 
recommendations, CEPI has tran-
sitioned into a startup phase. An 
international nonprofit associa-
tion has been founded by the 
governments of Norway and India, 
the Wellcome Trust, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and the 
World Economic Forum, and CEPI 
stakeholders are invited to be-
come formal partners. An interim 
board and scientific advisory 
committee have been appointed. 
An interim secretariat is ensuring 
CEPI’s launch, with functional 
nodes in Norway, the United King-
dom, and India.
CEPI will measure key out-
comes to assess its capacity to 
accelerate development of feasi-
ble vaccines that can have a pub-
lic health impact and to provide 
equitable access to affordable vac-
cines for priority populations. To 
this end, CEPI has developed a 
business plan with a budget of 
$1 billion for the next 5 years5 
focusing on two main objectives: 
advancing at least four candidate 
vaccines against two or three high-
priority pathogens to the proof-
of-concept stage (by supporting 
phase 1 and 2 trials) to enable 
clinical efficacy testing (phase 3) 
during the initial stages of an 
outbreak, and building technical 
and institutional platforms to ac-
celerate the research-and-develop-
ment response to the emergence 
of pathogens. CEPI will plan for 
and mobilize resources for phase 
3 efficacy trials as well as support 
small stockpiles, and it is explor-
ing ways of supporting research 
and development of multivalent 
Ebola vaccines and facilitating reg-
ulatory preparedness and stock-
piling.
CEPI plans to ensure the sus-
tainability of its partnership ap-
proach by securing industry par-
ticipation in collaborations in 
which the risks and benefits of 
vaccine development are shared 
and by supporting the develop-
ment of regional capabilities for 
epidemic vaccine preparedness. 
To ensure achievement of public 
benefit, CEPI and its partners 
will need to agree to reasonable 
obligations for making investiga-
tional stockpiles and vaccines 
available in sufficient quantities 
in affected territories and for set-
ting prices as low as possible. 
Product costs should also be 
minimized through these risk-
sharing arrangements.
A Joint Coordination Group 
was established in November 
2016 to help align CEPI’s efforts 
with those of other organizations 
in order to facilitate early devel-
opment and to address clinical, 
regulatory, access, and manufac-
turing issues. CEPI will soon issue 
its first requests for proposals for 
funding, focusing on pathogens 
prioritized by its scientific advi-
sory committee. CEPI also aims 
to collaborate with procurement 
agencies to facilitate investments 
in vaccine stockpiles for emer-
gency use beyond its own invest-
ments in smaller investigational 
stockpiles.
CEPI is in a strong position, 
with several governments and 
foundations having promised in-
vestments to meet its budgeted 
needs for 5 years. We have al-
ready partnered with experienced 
vaccine manufacturers with global 
reach, members of the Develop-
ing Countries Vaccine Manufac-
turers Network, and vaccine bio-
technology companies. We have 
accumulated expertise through our 
task teams and working groups 
and have benefited from the evi-
dence generated through the 
WHO Research and Development 
Blueprint process. To succeed, we 
will have to continue to attract and 
retain a broad range of top experts 
and institutional champions.
Without cross-sector coordina-
tion or focus on timely vaccine-
development capabilities, even the 
effort mounted against Ebola will 
be hard to replicate. We hope that 
CEPI’s capabilities and partner-
Without cross-sector coordination or focus  
on timely vaccine-development capabilities,  
even the effort mounted against Ebola  
will be hard to replicate.
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ships will enable it to adequately 
address epidemic vaccine-develop-
ment needs and help contain out-
breaks quickly, providing a sort 
of global health insurance policy. 
We look forward to collaborating 
with all relevant actors to achieve 
these goals.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
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For the first time since it was issued in 1991, the Common 
Rule — the set of federal regu-
lations for ethical conduct of 
human-subjects research — has 
been updated. Most of the new 
requirements, many of which in-
crease flexibility, will go into ef-
fect in 2018, which gives insti-
tutions a year to work toward 
implementation.
The public saw the begin-
nings of this effort in 2011, 
when the Department of Health 
and Human Services issued an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, signaling an interest in 
modernizing the regulations by 
enhancing protections for human 
research participants and reducing 
unnecessary burden and ambigu-
ity for researchers.1 In September 
2015, a Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (NPRM) identifying nu-
merous proposed changes was 
released for public comment, gen-
erating a robust and energetic dis-
cussion of the proposals’ merits.2 
More than 2100 comments were 
submitted, from a fairly wide 
swath of the public, including in-
dividuals, institutions, organiza-
tions, and societies. These com-
ments, and influential reports 
including one from the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineer-
ing, and Medicine,3 led to a long 
process of deliberation and dis-
cussion. The result is a final rule 
that differs significantly from 
what was initially proposed.
Most notably, the new rule 
does not adopt the proposal to 
cover researchers’ use of uniden-
tified biospecimens (such as left-
over portions of blood samples) 
and to require informed consent 
for such research. This proposal 
generated far more comments 
than any other, and by a substan-
tial margin those comments op-
posed the proposal. Commenters 
in every category — institutions, 
researchers, people working in 
programs that protect research 
participants, and people with no 
employment connection to the 
research world — expressed con-
cern that implementing this pro-
posal could significantly harm the 
ability to do important research, 
without producing any substan-
tial off-setting benefits. The pub-
lic response was particularly note-
worthy, given that the premise 
behind the proposal was specifi-
cally tied to public sentiment: 
the NPRM had stated that con-
tinuing to allow research on un-
identified biospecimens without 
consent would place “the publicly-
funded research establishment in 
an increasingly untenable posi-
tion because it is not consistent 
with the majority of the public’s 
wishes.” That premise now seems 
questionable. Accordingly, the pro-
posals that would have made it 
harder to do research with un-
identified biospecimens are not 
included in the new rule.
The rule also does not include 
proposals that were unpopular at 
least in part because they were 
dependent on additional rules or 
criteria that were not yet devel-
oped (and thus could not be 
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